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BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME:
BO UL WARE AND THE




For the ten-year period beginning in 1989, Michael Boulware
siphoned income from his Hawaiian Isles Enterprises, for which he was
president and CEO.1 Boulware hid the money from the corporation's
accountants, making false invoices, and setting up secret off-shore bank
accounts.2 When caught, he implicated his accountant, a well-respected
former state senator into his schemes, and even tried to shift the blame to
the deceased father of a federal district judge.3  After a three-year
protracted pre-trial legal battle, he was tried, and in 2004, the jury found
him guilty on all counts, only to have their conviction set aside by the
Ninth Circuit . He was tried again, and again in 2006 the jury found him
guilty on all counts.5 With the help of a high-powered corporate legal
team, he appealed, this time taking his case to the Supreme Court. 6 In
March of 2008 the Supreme Court again set aside his conviction, and
almost 10 years after being charged, and after having been found guilty
twice, the Supreme Court gave Boulware yet another retrial, while his
bookkeeper and personal accountant served time for aiding and abetting his
fraud.7
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009.
1. United States v. Boulware, 470 F.3d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (Boulware II).
2. Brief for the Respondent, Boulware v. United States, 470 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-
1509).
3. Id.
4. Boulware II, 470 F.3d at 932.
5. Id.
6. United States v. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008).
7. Id.
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A. THE INQUEST ON THE ISLAND
Michael Boulware was the founder and majority owner of Hawaiian
Isles Enterprises.8  Hawaiian Isles Enterprises was a closely held
corporation which dealt in tobacco distribution, coffee processing and
sales, arcade games, vending machines, and bottled water.9 In 1999,
Boulware was charged with four counts of tax evasion, five counts of filing
a false tax return, and one count of conspiracy to make false statements to a
financial institution.' ° For the years 1989 to 1997, Miller was accused of
using a variety of methods to divert over $10 million from Hawaiian Isles
Enterprises and to conceal the income in order to evade tax." Among other
things, Boulware was accused of diverting approximately $1.3 million of
company funds directly to his mistress; diverting $3.6 million of company
funds to bank accounts that he hid from his company's controller; using
fake invoices and lease agreements to obtain loan funding; and expensing
$1 million of personal payments to his ex-wife to his corporation. 12 The
government also alleged that after becoming aware that he was the target of
an IRS investigation, Boulware set up a series of off-shore corporations in
Tonga and Hong Kong to launder diverted funds from Hawaiian Isles
Enterprises and created approximately $1.8 million in fraudulent corporate
expenses. 13
A jury in the U.S. District Court in Hawaii found Boulware guilty and
convicted on all counts.14 Boulware appealed his conviction, and the Ninth
Circuit reversed his conviction due to the district court's erroneous
exclusion of evidence of a Hawaii state court's adjudication of Hawaiian
Isles Enterprises certain property rights and remanded. 15 Upon the Ninth
Circuit's instruction, Boulware was retried in the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii, before the Honorable Edward Rafeedie.16
In order to prove a charge of tax evasion, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) an affirmative attempt to evade or defeat tax
(2) willfulness (3) and an actual tax deficiency.' 7 In Boulware's second
trial, his defense team attempted attacked the third required element, an
actual tax deficiency, by raising a return-of-capital defense, a variation of
8. Boulware II, 470 F.3d at 932.
9. Id.
10. Id.




14. Boulware 11, 470 F.3d at 933.
15. United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 2004) (Boulware 1).
16. Boulware 11, 470 F.3d at 932.
17. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
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the no-tax owed defense. 18 A no-tax due defense generally claims that
either unreported income on which the evasion charge is alleged either
constituted non-taxable income or would have netted no income tax
liability due to unreported deductions.1 9 For example, if a taxpayer
knowingly did not report a stock transaction that netted four thousand
dollars in capital gain income, but also failed to report a second stock
transaction which netted a capital loss of five thousand dollars, the taxpayer
though making affirmative attempts to hide his income would not have an
actual tax deficiency for the year in question. Because an "actual tax
deficiency" can be legally determined, the lack of an actual tax deficiency
is a form of legal impossibility defense. The defendant claims that he or
she did not have an actual tax deficiency for the year in question, and
therefore it was legally impossible to evade taxes.2°
The return-of-capital defense is a claim of no actual tax deficiency. It
is raised by defendants who are alleged to have been skimming funds from
corporations of which they are majority shareholders. Section 301 of the
Internal Revenue Code governs the tax treatment of distributions of
property that are "made by a corporation with respect to its stock.21
Subsection (c) of Section 301 if the distribution is dividend as defined by
Section 316, it will be considered as part of recipient's taxable income.22 If
the distribution is not a dividend, then the distribution will be considered a
nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder's basis for his stock.23
Section 316 defines a dividend as "any distribution of property made by a
corporation to its shareholders ... out of its earnings and profits of the
taxable year (computed as of the close of the taxable year without
diminution by reason of any distributions made during the taxable year),
without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the
distribution was made., 24 In a year in which the corporation has no profits,
a shareholder can receive a nontaxable distribution of funds with a
concurrent reduction in the shareholder's basis in his stock.25
During to the second trial, Boulware's attorneys sought to raise the
return-of-capital defense against the tax evasion charges.26 They contended
that if the funds that Boulware diverted from 1989 through 1997 were
18. Boulware I, 470 F.3d at 934.
19. The court first recognized the validity of the no-tax due defense in United States v. O'Brien, 51
F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1931).
20. For a more thorough discussion of the no tax due defense, see Ronald H. Jensen, Article,
Reflections on United States v. Leona Helmsely: Should 'Impossibility' be a Defense to Attempted
Income Tax Evasion, 12 VA. TAX REV. 335 (1993).
21. I.R.C. § 30 1(c) (2008).
22. Id.
23, Id.
24. I.R.C. § 316 (2008).
25. § 301(b).
26. Boulware I, 470 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2006).
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characterized as returns of capital, there would be no actual tax deficiency
on the funds, as they would be considered nontaxable constructive
distributions. 27 In response, the Government moved in limine to preclude
the return-of-capital defense, relying on a United States v. Miller.28 To
which Boulware's legal team filed a response, proffering the testimony of
an expert who would explain that the diverted funds could have been a
return of capital, depending on whether the corporation had earnings and
profits for the years in question.29 Judge Rafeedie precluded the defense,
ruling that Boulware had not laid the proper foundation to meet the
threshold requirements established in Miller3° to proceed with the defense.
B. MILLER MAKES ITS MARK
In Miller, the Ninth Circuit faced a strikingly similar situation as the
one Judge Rafeedie faced in deciding the Government's motion in
Boulware. In Miller, the defendant had diverted income from his
corporation, booking the income as loans. 31 The defendant used corporate
funds pay "virtually all of his personal bills (from his mortgage on his
home to his 'Book-of-the-Month' Club obligations). 32  Miller was
convicted of filing false corporate tax returns and of income tax evasion.
33
On appeal, Miller argued that the diverted funds had to be treated as a
constructive distribution to a shareholder, and that the distribution was a
non-taxable return of capital since the corporation had no profits for the
years at issue.34 The Miller court refused to automatically apply the
constructive distribution rules in the context of criminal tax evasion, on the
basis that doing so ignores the most important element of tax evasion-
willful intent to evade taxes.35
Where the taxpayer has sought to conceal income by filing a false
return, he has violated the tax evasion statutes. It does not matter that
that amount could have somehow been made nontaxable if the taxpayer
had proceeded on a different course. To apply the constructive





30. Id.; see also United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1215 (9th Cir. 1976).
31. Miller, 545 F.2d at 1209.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1207-08.
34. Id. at 1209.
35. Id. at 1214.
36. Id.
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The Miller court went on to point out that, to allow the return of
capital defense would result in "anomalous" situation where a taxpayer
who diverted funds from his corporation when it was in financial trouble
and had no profits would be immune from punishment, but the very same
taxpayer would be convicted if he diverted funds from his corporation
when it had experienced a financially successful year.37 The Miller court
went on to say that such a result would constitute an "extreme example of
form over substance. 38
The Miller court found that for diverted funds to be considered a
return of capital, that where the Government has made a prima facie case of
failure to report diverted corporate funds, the defendant must demonstrate
an intent on the part of the defendant or the corporation that the funds
constitute a return of capital. 39 The defendant must produce some evidence
that demonstrated the return of capital distributions were made, not just that
they could have been made.n°
Based on the standard set forth in Miller, Judge Rafeedie granted the
Government's motion to preclude Boulware's return of capital defense on
the grounds that Boulware had failed to proffer any evidence that the
diverted funds were in considered, intended, or recorded as a return of
capital.4 ' In fact, whereas the defendant in Miller had at least provided
evidence that the corporation had no earnings or profits, Boulware merely
posited that whether the corporation had earnings or profits could be left to
the jury.
42
Upon completion of the second trial, the jury once again found
Boulware guilty on all counts. Judge Rafeedie upped Boulware's term of
custody from the 51 months that Boulware had received on his first
conviction to 60 months based on evidence adduced in the second trial that
Boulware had perpetuated his fraudulent activities even after he knew that
he was being investigated by the Government.43 At sentencing, Judge
Rafeedie said Boulware had displayed "unnecessary greed" in his extreme
measures to hide his income. 44 Boulware apologized, saying that he was
sorry and that it would never happen again. 5 However, Boulware would
soon thereafter appeal his conviction on a number of grounds, including the
district court's decision to preclude Boulware from raising the return-of-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1214-15.
40. Id. at 1215.
41. Boulware I1, 470 F.3d 931, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2006).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 932.
44. Curtis Lim, Sentence is Stiffer Second Time Around, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 25,
2005.
45. Id.
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capital defense.46
C. MILLER MEETS ITS MAKER
Boulware appealed the district court's decision on the basis that the
Miller rule failed on three counts: (1) requiring intent for return of capital
when raised as a defense against tax evasion created a disconnect between
application of Internal Revenue Code in criminal and civil cases, (2) Miller
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the defendant (3) that the
Miller decision puts the Ninth Circuit in conflict with the Second Circuit's
recent decisions in United States v. D'Agostino47 and United States v.
Bok.
48
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the rule in Miller created a distinction
between the application of the Internal Revenue laws in a criminal and civil
context.49 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the different treatment was
justified in the context the return of capital provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code were being applied, approving Miller's holding that "civil
classifications of diverted corporate funds do not control in criminal
cases."5 ° The court further cited to more recent decisions, United States v.
Williams and United States v. Schmidt, from the 11 th and 4th Circuits that
approved Miller's distinction between civil and criminal application of
constructive distribution rulesi 1
In regards to the defendant's burden of proof, the Ninth Circuit
restated the Miller rule, and held that once the government had meet its
prima facie burden the taxpayer failed to report diverted corporate funds,
the burden shifted to the taxpayer to show that the diverted funds were a
return of capital.52 However, in D'Agostino, the Second Circuit found that
requiring "contemporaneous" intent fashioned under the Miller rule would
result in lower burden of proof for the government in criminal tax evasion
cases than in civil tax collection cases. The Second Circuit ruled that the
Williams approach (in which the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Miller rule)
"effectively eliminates proof of a tax deficiency as an element of a 26
46. Brief for the Respondent, Boulware v. United States, 470 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-
1509).
47. United States v. D'Agostino, 145 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1998).
48. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1998). See Boulware II, 470 F.3d at 935.
49. Boulware II, 470 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2006).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 875 F.2d 846, 849-852 (1 1th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Schmidt, 935 F.2d 1440, 1446 (4th Cir. 1991)
52. Boulware 11, 470 F.3d at 935.
53. D'Agostino, 145 F.3d at 71.
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U.S.C. 7201 violation., 54 The Second Circuit further concluded that by
that token, under the Miller rule, the government only needed to prove that
a taxpayer willfully diverted funds under its control, and took affirmative
acts to evade taxation.55 The Second Circuit found this result unacceptable,
stating that "[i]f Congress intended this showing to suffice to establish a
violation of 7201, it would not have included a tax deficit as a requisite
element." (emphasis added)
56
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Miller rule was in conflict with
Second Circuit's recent decisions, but noted that the Second Circuit's view
was not the prevailing view among federal courts and that the Miller rule
still stood in the Ninth Circuit, and therefore the district court's decision to
preclude return of capital defense due to lack of foundation was proper.
57
The Ninth Circuit, however, was not unanimous in its approval of the
reasoning behind Miller. In concurrence, Judge Thomas criticized Miller
because it allows that "a defendant may be criminally sanctioned for tax
evasion without owing a penny in taxes to the government. Not only does
this result indicate a logical fallacy, but it is in flat contradiction with the
tax evasion statute's requirement of a tax deficiency." 58 Judge Thomas
further stated that if he was not constrained by Miller, he would adopt the
Second Circuit's approach in D'Agostino.59 However, bound by Miller,
Thomas concurred with the majority and Boulware's conviction was
unanimously affirmed.6 °
With a concurrence unfriendly to the Miller rule and circuit split on
the issue, the Boulware case seemed ripe for appeal. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari soon thereafter. 6' The Supreme Court does not grant
certiorari often to cases involving tax law, but it does however seem to
have a keen interest in overruling the Ninth Circuit, and the Court was not
going to pass up the opportunity here.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE MILLER RULE
At oral arguments it was clear that the struggle between criminal
intent and tax code that the Ninth Circuit had found themselves enmeshed
in, was not on the forefront of the Justices minds. During oral arguments,
54. Id. at 72.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Boulware 11, 470 F.3d at 935.
58. Id. at 938.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 937.
61. Boulware v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007).
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Justice Ginsburg mistakenly alluded to the case's origin in tax court and
had to be informed that this was not a civil tax case, but one for criminal
tax evasion.62
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court struck down the Miller
rule, requiring a showing of what the Court called "contemporaneous
intent" to raise the return of capital defense in criminal tax evasion cases.63
Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the court. The Court held that:
It is neither here nor there whether the Miller court was justified in
thinking it would improve things to convict more of the evasively
inclined by dropping the deficiency requirement and finding some other
device to exempt returns of capital. Even if there were compelling
reasons to extend § 7201 to cases in which no taxes are owed, it bears
repeating that "[t]he spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal
judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should
not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from
anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the
words used in the statute."
64
The Court stressed that neither Section 301 nor Section 316 governing
65the return of capital were written to include an intent requirement. But
even more importantly, the Court accused the Ninth Circuit of removing a
statutory element of the crime of tax evasion.66 The Court held that though
the Miller court had held that the acquittal of a taxpayer of tax evasion
based on automatic application of the return of capital provisions67 "would
constitute an extreme example of form over substance," what such a
situation would really constitute was the government's failure to prove an
essential element of the crime of tax evasion, an actual tax deficiency.
68
The Court stated that by requiring the taxpayer to prove contemporaneous
intent, the Miller rule unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving an
essential element of the crime onto the defendant. 69  The Court
acknowledged that § 7201 "could stand amending," but held that it was
bound by the words of the statute requiring that an actual tax deficiency be
proven.
With that, the Supreme Court vacated the holding of the Ninth
Circuit, and remanded the case back to the district court in Hawaii for
62. Oral Argument, Boulware v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (No. 06-1509)
63. Boulware v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1180 (2007).
64. Id.; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (emphasis added).
65. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1177.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 1976).
68. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1177.
69. Id.
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retrial yet again.7°
A. OH WHAT A WICKED WEB WE WEAVE...
Section 7201 of the I.R.C. reads:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by the law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs of the prosecution. (emphasis added)71
While the first two elements of the charge of tax evasion-willfulness
and an affirmative attempt-are readily apparent from the statute, the third
element, and actual tax deficiency seems to be missing. The words "any
tax imposed" arguably could be interpreted as such, if the word "tax" is
defined as a specific dollar amount of tax deficiency owed. However, the
word "tax" could just as easily be defined as a system of fees or tariffs
imposed on a person's wealth. For example, when one says "I still owe
taxes," that statement can be interpreted as a statement that the person still
owes a certain known dollar amount of tax deficiency, or conversely that
the person still has yet to fulfill his burden of paying his yearly income tax.
Yet it seems as if it must be less ambiguous than that, as the Supreme
Court in Boulware makes repeated reference to the "statutory" element of
tax evasion-an actual tax deficiency.72  In fact, the Supreme Court
centered its decision to strike down the Miller rule based on the perceived
harm the Miller rule had on this statutory element of criminal tax evasion.73
However, if we look back at the origins of the so called "element" of an
actual tax deficiency, we find that the long string of authority recognizing
this element were not founded in the bedrock of statute, but in dictum,a
foundation of sand.
Almost without fail, every Supreme Court case, and lower court cases
cite Sansone v. United States for the supposition of the three elements of
tax evasion: (1) willful intent (2) an affirmative act of evasion (3) and an
actual tax deficiency.74 The Court in Sansone itself cited two prior cases as
authority for the actual tax deficiency element of tax evasion, Lawn v.
United States75 and Spies v. United States.76 However, a closer look finds
70. Id. at 1175.
71. I.R.C. § 7201 (2008).
72. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1179
73. Id.
74. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
75. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 361 (1958)
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that neither provides strong support for this so-called statutory element of
tax evasion. In Spies, the Court does not even address the issue directly,
only going so far as to say that criminal tax evasion should be
distinguishable from the lesser crime of filing false tax returns. 77 In Lawn,
the Court states in dictum:
[w]hile, of course, a conviction upon a charge of attempting to evade
assessment of income taxes by the filing of fraudulent return cannot
stand in the absence of proof of a deficiency, the court's charge did not
create the credit claimed by Livorsi. It only withdrew from the jury's
consideration the government's claim that his income from Eatsum in
that year was ... more than he reported in his return.78
And on that dictum, the third statutory element of tax evasion was
born: actual tax deficiency.
B .... WHEN FIRST WE PRACTICE TO DECEIVE.
Even if the Court would concede that perhaps the requirement of an
"actual tax deficiency" is really a court made rule, the question still stands
whether a requirement for an actual tax deficiency sans intent, derived
from the word "tax" in § 7201, is the correct interpretation of the tax
evasion statute.
The answer ironically enough can be gleaned from a more complete
look at a case often cited by critics of tax evasion, and cited by the Court in
Boulware.79 In Helvering v. Gregory, arguably the most famous judicial
opinion on tax, Judge Learned Hand proclaimed that "[a]ny one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. 's What critics often overlook is the
discussion that immediately follows. In Helvering, the Second Circuit8e '
faced a situation where a taxpayer had used the corporate reorganization
rules82 to circumvent paying taxes on income from a corporation of which
he was sole shareholder, in a manner that was technically correct.83 The
taxpayer claimed that all the transactions being correct, the purpose was
76. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943)
77. Id. at 495.
78. Lawn, 355 U.S. at 361.
79. Boulware v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1176 n.7 (2007).
80. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
81. Helvering was also cited as supporting precedent in the Second Circuit's later opinion in
D 'Agostino.
82. At the time Helvering was decided, the corporate restructuring statute was section 112 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1928.
83. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 810.
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irrelevant.84 After famously stating a taxpayer's right to arrange his affairs,
Judge Hand followed:
Therefore, if what was done here, was what was intended by section
1 12(i)(1)(B) [corporate reorganization rules], it is of no consequence
that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income taxes, as it
certainly was. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to
cover such a transaction, not even though the facts answer the
dictionary definitions of each term used in the statutory definition...
the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words,
as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can
ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all
collectively create ... the underlying presupposition is plain that the
readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of
the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to its
prosecution. To dodge the shareholder's taxes is not one of the
transactions contemplated as corporate "reorganizations.
'" 85
The Second Circuit's decision in Helvering, argued that a tax statute
cannot be interpreted solely by the definitions of the word in the statute.
86
Instead, the Second Circuit stated that "as a melody is more than the notes"
and that in interpreting the statute, the intention of the statute itself must be
examined. 87 Justice Sutherland, writing the Supreme Court's decision
affirming the Second Circuit's decision, stated "[t]o hold otherwise would
be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in
question of all serious purpose.
' 88
The Court similarly needs to look beyond the definitions of the words
in the tax evasion statute, and examine the statute's purpose. The tax
evasion statute's purpose was to punish taxpayers who attempt to evade or
defeat tax. The statute includes that the attempt must be willful, making it
clear the purpose is to punish criminal intent.89 The Court is distorting the
purpose of § 7201 when it disallows the punishment of individuals who
made every attempt to evade taxation in a criminal manner, but after being
caught can show their attempt could be made futile based on a technical
application of rules governing distribution of corporate property. The
Court in Boulware hinges the allowance of return of capital defense on the
Court's interpretation of the "any tax imposed" to mean requiring the strict
adherence to the existence of an actual tax deficiency. Such an
interpretation is wrong as far as it contravenes the purpose of the tax
84. Id.
85. Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
89. I.R.C. § 7201 (2008).
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evasion statute.
The Helvering guide to statutory interpretation can also apply to the
Court's interpretation of Section 301 itself. In Boulware, the Court held
that an intent prerequisite cannot be imposed on the return-of-capital
defense, because Section 301(c), in its text "expressly provides that
distributions made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its
stock 'shall be treated in the manner provided in [§ 301(c)]."' 9° The Court
further emphasized that the word "shall" preclude any modification or
condition, such as prerequisite intent in a criminal tax evasion case, from
being imposed on the application of Section 301(c) on corporate
distributions to shareholders."
This interpretation goes against Judge Hand's teaching in Helvering
that a tax statute must be defined by more than it's separate words and
should be considered in the setting in which it appears.92 The interpretation
the Court adopts in Boulware disregards both the purpose of Section 301(c)
and the setting in which it is being applied. If the Court did analyze the
purpose of Section 301(c) it could not reasonably conclude that purpose of
the return of capital provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were to
provide a defense to tax evasion charges brought in result of a
shareholder's deceitful diversion of corporate funds. As far as analyzing the
setting in which Section 301(c) is being applied, the Court not only failed
to do so but it harshly admonished the Ninth Circuit for doing so. In the
court of appeals opinion in Boulware, the Ninth Circuit recognized that by
imposing a prerequisite intent, it was interpreting the application of Section
301(c) differently in a criminal tax evasion case, as it would in a civil
context. 94 Very shortly after citing Helvering for the proposition that a
taxpayer can arrange his affairs the manner that he wishes to, the Court
stated that this dual interpretation of Section 301(c) was wrong as it had no
basis in the text of the section, going so far as mocking the Ninth Circuit by
revealing its failure to find the written word "intent" in Section 301.9' The
Court did not take the setting into account, but instead did what Judge
Learned Hand had warned against doing in Helvering, interpret the statute
based on the literal definition of its words alone.96
90. Boulware v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1179 (2007).
91. Id.
92. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
93. Id. at 1178.
94. Boulware I1, 470 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2006).
95. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1178.
96. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 811.
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III. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
Right or wrong, Boulware marked the demise of the Miller rule and
the setting of a rigid, literalist standard for judicial interpretation of tax
statutes. A majority shareholder could divert corporate funds with the most
malicious and evil intent to evade tax, make repeated attempts to evade tax,
subject others to criminal tax prosecution and yet still not be guilty of tax
evasion based solely on the fact that through an application of a tax statute
of which he or she was totally unaware of at the time could have made his
or her hidden income nontaxable.
Such a result seems morally reprehensible. Yet, as long as the Court
refuses to interpret the return of capital provisions outside of the strict
definition of the text, and the requirement of an actual tax deficiency
continues to be recognized the result in Boulware can continue to be
justified as another extension of the Legal Impossibility Doctrine.97 With
retrospective application of the return of capital provisions, the government
cannot prove a so-called element of the offense of tax evasion, an actual tax
deficiency, and thus the deceitful tax payer defeats the charge.
Our tax system relies on the good faith of the taxpayers to honestly
self-report their income. The malicious and deceitful practice of tax
evaders undermines the trust that serves as the bedrock of the self-reporting
system, and should be criminally prosecuted. The Court's interpretation of
the return of capital and tax evasion statutes in Boulware contravenes that
very principle. However, Boulware is now the law of the land, and without
the Miller rule, we must look elsewhere to assure Section 7201 can fulfill
its purpose to maintain the integrity of the capital markets.
The first solution, as the Supreme Court alluded to in dicta in
Boulware, would be for Congress to amend Section 301 to build in an
intent requirement in criminal tax cases, effectively overruling the Court's
decision in Boulware.98 However, such a statute may face challenge in the
Supreme Court for creating the same "tax limbo" which the Court found
repulsive, by distinguishing between statutory application in a criminal and
civil context. 99 Further, even if the statute was upheld, it would only
preclude the abuse of the return of capital provision by criminal tax
evaders, merely inciting tax evaders to find yet another leak in the tax code
to exploit.
Conversely, Congress can amend Section 7201 to put an end to the
97. For more on the Legal Impossibility doctrine in tax evasion, see Ronald H. Jensen, Article,
Reflections on United States v. Leona Helmsely: Should 'Impossibility' be a Defense to Attempted
Income Tax Evasion, 12 VA. TAX REv. 335.
98. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1178.
99. Id. at 1180.
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so-called "statutory" element of an actual tax deficiency. Of course,
Congress would need to do so very explicitly to prevent another loose
judicial interpretation from rebirthing the actual tax deficiency. Congress
could perhaps amend the statute by altering "any tax imposed"' 00 to "any
manner or method of taxation imposed, regardless of the existence of an
actual tax deficiency." This would assuredly preclude an interpretation that
the statute required an actual tax deficiency to exist.
However, in considering that the requirement of an actual tax
deficiency is really more a court fashioned rule than a statutory element of
tax evasion, and that the Court in Boulware implied that the dropping of the
element might be justified °1 , the Court itself should act to remedy the
problem. Justice Black, in a stinging dissent to a Supreme Court case that
denied a jury award to children of victims of railroad death, famously
stated that "[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that
can be made to support a court fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's
creator to destroy it.' 2 The Court should revisit the wisdom of those who
have sat on the bench before it. Perhaps it is the time for the Court to
acknowledge that it is time to do away with the actual tax deficiency rule,
born in dictum and forged in repetition.
100. I.R.C. § 7201 (2008).
101. Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1178.
102. Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting).
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